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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EJ)DIE IfOOGLAND, 
by his Guardian ad Litem, 
Roelof Hoogland, 
Plaintiff and Appellanl, 
-- "~/S.-
THO~fAS B. CHILD and 
C. W. CHILD, 
dba THOMAS B.CHIL.D & CO.; 
J..:tCK ALDER and ROBERT R. 
CHILD, dba. ALDER-CHILD 
CONSTRUCTION CO. 




STATEMENT OF F·1ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 
This is an action brought by the Guardian of the 
plaintiff, Eddie Hoogland, a minor, for injuries result-
ing in the amputation of both of his legs, and other per-
manent injuries when an explosive compound, which 'vas 
stored on the property of the defendants, blew up. 
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The defendant, Thomas B. Child, is the owner of 
property located at 452 South 8th East Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. This property had for many years been 
a place of curiosity due to the fact that this defendant 
had carved large figures and statues from stone which 
were arranged about the yard, many weighing as much 
as 25 to 40 tons. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, pp. 
23, 24 and 25.) These premises were a great curiosity and 
operated in the nature of a park. No effort was ever 
made to secure the gate leading into the property, and 
the defendant was aware that children frequented the 
yard. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 23, lines 
3-14; p. 26, lines 3-26. )-
'' Q. And people have come from all over the area 
who were curious to see this work and try to 
figure out what you were driving at, isn't 
that true~~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the gates were open, and the people come 
in, and the people look, isn't that true¥ 
A. Yes.',. (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, pp. 
25-26.) 
The property was used so frequently as a playground by 
the children in the neighborhood that it kept the defend-
ant quite busy attempting to restrict the play, and though 
he advised the children that they had no right in the 
yard, yet the defendant made no effort to secure the 
property so that the children could not make a play-
ground of it. (See Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 26.) 
In the yard, pursuant to agreement with Thomas: B. 
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Child, the defendants, Alder-Child Construction Co., and 
rrhomas B. Child, stored various rna terials used in the 
construction business, including dangerous acids and 
other compounds. In the yard was a shed which could be 
locked, but nevertheless the acids and other compounds 
were kept outside in the yard where children playing· 
could have ready access to them, because the defendant 
felt the fumes would damage the machinery which was 
locked in the shed. The defendant was fully aware of the 
danger of these compounds to children playing in the 
yard: 
"Q. Did it ever occur to you that children might 
get into the acids and get hurt~ 
A. Well, it might occur to anybody else, but I 
store it just like the big companies do their 
acids. They keep them on the platform and 
things around. 
Q. I ask you if it occurred to you that children 
might come into the yard and be hurt. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That occurred to you~ 
A. Sure." (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 30.) 
On or about the 17th of February, 1957, the plaintiff 
was attracted onto the premises by the statues, machinery, 
barrels, and other contents located thereon. He explored 
the contents of the barrel containing the explosive ma-
terial by holding a lighted match or torch by the barrel 
opening. It thereupon exploded, causing the above 
described serious injuries. 
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Plaintiff, by his Guardian, filed suit against the de-
fendants for damage. The defendants made a motion for 
Summary Judgment, the District Court granted said mo-
tion, and from that judgment the plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AS: 
(1) GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
DO EXIST. 
(2) QUESTIONS PECULIAR TO THE ATTRAC-
TIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD 
BE TRIED. 
(3) THE FACTS ALLEGED MUST BE CONSID-
ERED AND APPLIED IN A MANNER 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
PoiNT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF UNDER WHAT IS COMMONLY 
CALLED THE PLAYGROUND DOCTRINE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE DOCTRINE COM-
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AS: 
(1) GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS 
DO EXIST. 
(2) QUESTIONS PECULIAR TO THE ATTRAC-
TIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE SHOULD 
BE TRIED. 
(3) THE FACTS ALLEGED MUST BE CONSID-
ERED AND APPLIED IN A MANNER 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
(1) In granting Summary Judgment to the defend-
ants, Jack Alder and Robert R. Child, the trial court 
found all of the following facts : (See Record, page 81) 
(a) The drum of Seal-Tex was not an unusual and 
extraordinary thing. 
(b) Said drum was not dangerous per se, or if so 
there was no reason for said defendants to 
think it so. 
(c) Said defendants did not know or had no rea-
son to know the Seal-Tex was dangerous 
to children. 
(d) The Seal-Tex did not attract the plaintiff onto 
the premises involved. 
(e) The plaintiff used the Seal-Tex in an unordi-
nary and unexpected way. 
(f) The plaintiff was not one of tender years 
within the Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance. 
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(g) The plaintiff knew the Seal-Tex was dan 
gerous. 
(h) The premises involved were not used as a 
playground, or, at least, said defendants 
didn't know so. 
It is of great interest that the trial judge could con-
clude all these facts. For him to do so he must have had 
complete trust in the credibility of deponent Robert B. 
Child - and to the contrary had no faith whatsoever in 
the deponent plaintiff. It is fascinating that the trial 
judge could be so overwhelmingly persuaded of all these 
facts by a deponent who, as a civil engineer, first cate-
gorically denied any knowledge of the organic nature 
of asphalt and then in direct contradiction acknowledged 
that asphalt is made of sand and gravel mixed with an 
oil base. (Deposition, Robert R. Child, p. 13, lines 23 to 27) 
In granting Summary Judgment to defendant 
rrhomas B. Child, the trial judge found the same series 
of facts as recited above, plus the fact that defendant 
Thomas B. Child had no actual or constructive knowl-
edge that the drum involved contained Seal-Tex, or that 
said product was stored on his premises. These findings 
are apparently based on the deposition of said defendant 
Child and again apparently prompted by implicit faith in 
the statements of said deponent. To belieYe that the yard 
of said defendant "\vas not a playground, to believe that 
children did not go on the yard, to belieYe that the yard 
was not attractive to children and the Seal-Tex stored 
there not dangerous, and to believe that the plain tiff "\Yas 
not of tender years, one must completely ignore the fact 
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of the explosion, the deposition of the plaintiff, and the 
allegations of the complaint. It would seem impossible to 
eo11elude that no issue exists as to these material facts. It 
would also seem that the trial judge in awarding Sum-
mary Judgment in this matter considered the facts in 
a light most favorable to the defendants. And it would 
seem tragic that a boy, severely burned, both legs de-
stroyed, and deprived forever of a normal life, should be 
denied at least the chance of a day in court to tell his 
story, because of such error by the trial judge. 
Rule 56 (c) URCL reads in part as follows : 
''The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law ... '' 
The trial judge must find that no genuine issue as to 
any material fact exists and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law. "If ... there is 
a genuine issue as to a material fact, the case should 
go to trial." (Moore, FederaZ Practice, Section 56.04) 
"A summary judgment is a judgment in bar that results 
from an application of substantive law to facts that estab-
lished beyond reasonable controversy.'' (Ibid, Section 
56.11) ''All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue 
as to a material fact must be resolved against the party 
moving for a summary judgment.'' (Weisser v. M ursam 
Shoe Corp., 1942, 127 F. 2d 344) "Under this rule (Rule 
56 (c) ) it is clear that if there is any genuine issue as to 
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any material fact, the motion should be denied.'' (Young 
v. Telornria, 1952, 121 U. 646, 244 P. 2d 862) We submit 
that there are genuine issues as to all those facts found 
by the trial judge. 
( 2) ''Here we start with the general proposition that 
issues of negligence, including such related issues as con-
tributory negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of 
summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, 
but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.'' 
(Moore, supra, Sect. 56.17 ( 42).) In the very case by 
which the Utah supreme court adopted the attractive 
nuisance rule (Brown v. Salt Lake City, 1908, 33 U. 223, 
93 P. 570) the court indicated that should it be trying the 
facts it would have arrived at a different conclusion than 
that reached by the jury, but that the trial court was cor-
rect in charging the jury with questions as to the attrac-
tiveness of the danger, whether or not the alleged danger 
"\vas in fact dangerous, whether defendant was responsible 
for the danger and whether or not the defendant should 
have foreseen that the danger might he injurious to chil-
dren. Other jurisdictions have held similarly that the fol-
lowing are jury questions : 
(a) The immaturity and mental capacity of the 
child. (Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 242 
S.W. 2d 714; K eck v. lTT oodring, 208 P. 2d 
1133; Moseley Y. Kansas City, 228 P. 2d 699; 
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Earles' Admin.is., 22 
s.w. 2d 929.) 
(b) The dangerousness of the device causing the 
injury. (Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., 235 P. 
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~d 84:3; Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E. 
2d 836.) 
(c) The sufficiency of the care exercised by the 
O\Yner. (Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., supra; 
Ford v. Blythe Bros. Co., 87 S.E. 2d 879; 
Svienty v. Penn. R. Co., 132 N.E. 2d 83; Har-
ris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A. 2d 388.) 
(d) The attractiveness of the danger to children. 
(Kahn v. Jar;nes Burton Co., supra; Ford v. 
Blythe Bors. Co., supra.; Keck v. Woodrin.g, 
supra.; Verrichia v. Society Di M.S. Del Laxio, 
79 lA. 2d 237.) 
We submit that the questions involved in this case, 
when controverted, are the kinds of questions which 
should go to the trier of fact. 
(3) Certainly the trial judge was obligated to con-
sider the pleadings and other matters of record in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. 
"A Court should not direct a verdict in favor 
of a defendant unless the evidence is wholly lack-
ing to prove some issue necessary to support the 
plaintiff's claim and unless no reasonable or logi-
cal inferences may be drawn by the jury based 
upon the evidence which would support the plain-
tiff's claim. That general rule has so often been 
stated by this and other Courts that it may be said 
to have become elementary.'' (Ellerbeck v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 63 U. 530, 227 Pac. 805) 
In the Utah case of Christiansen v. L. A. & S. L. R. 
R. Co., reported in 77 Utah 85, 291 Pac. 926, p. 90, the 
Court has this to say: 
''The evidence on these issues was in dispute, 
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but for the purpose of passing on defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be 
considered and applied most favorable to plain-
tiff's cause of action. Grossbeck v. Lake Side 
Printing Co., 55 Utah 335, 186 P. 103. Plaintiff's 
evidence must be taken as true and every legiti-
mate inference drawn in its favor. 1\1abetto v. 
Wolfe. (Cal. App. 289 P. 218)." 
In the Utah case of Robinson v. Salt Lake City, re-
ported in 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817, pp. 527, 528 of the 
1Jtah Reports, the Supreme Court in deciding the pro-
priety of a non-suit granted by the lower court, said: 
''True the evidence may not be overwhelming, 
nor even strong on some of the points, and it may 
even tend to show contributory negligence; but 
whether the evidence is strong or weak, or whether 
there is some evidence of contributory negligence 
or not, is not the test. The test is ''Thether or not 
there is some substantial evidence in support of 
every essential fact which a. plaintiff is required 
to prove in order to entitle him to recover. If the 
evidence and the inferences are of the character 
... Nhich would authorize reasonable men to arriYe 
at different conclusions with respect to "\Yhether 
all the essential facts vvere or were not proven, the 
question is one of fact and not of law. This is so 
although the evidence on some points may be un-
satisfactory or doubtful. (Bro,Yn v. Salt Lake City, 
33 Utah, 242, 93 Pac. 570, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619, 
126 Am. St. Rep. 828.) This has so often been said 
by the courts that the rule has become elementary.'' 
We submit that obviously the trial judge did not 
consider and apply the alleged facts in a manner most 
favorable to the plaintiff, that this "\Yas error, and that 
this appellate court must now do so. 
10 
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PoiNT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF UNDER WHAT IS COMMONLY 
CALLED THE PLAYGROUND DOCTRINE. 
Where a person maintains a yard and it is known 
to be a place where children habitually play, whether 
by permission or not, persons knowing of this fact must 
use reasonable care to keep the area safe for children 
'vho may come upon it, or to take reasonable steps to 
exclude them from the property. The placing upon the 
property of any objects which a reasonable person might 
know could injure children playing on such property, is 
negligence. 
Under the Playground Rule, if an owner or person 
in control of property knows, or has reason to know that 
children habitually play upon his land to the extent that 
it becomes known as a playground, he is bound to exer-
cise reasonable care to see that the premises are safe for 
the purpose or must at least warn of known dangerous 
conditions. (Personal Injury, Actions-Defense-Dam-
ages, by Louis R. Frumer and R. L. Benoit, Section 
103(2).) 
If we examine the deposition of Thomas B. Child, 
the owner of the premises on which the accident oc-
curred, and consider the testimony and record most fav-
orable to the plaintiff and against the defendant, it is 
difficult to come to any other conclusion except that the 
premises had been made by the defendant into a park, at 
least semi-public. The defendant took great pride in his 
11 
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alleged works of art which he carved from stone and 
arranged at various points around the property. He was 
flattered by the newspaper publicity and admits that the 
place was a point of interest to many, many people in 
the area, both young and old. The testimony of Thomas 
B. Child cited in the Statement of Facts to the effect that 
he chased children from the yard almost constantly, or 
told them that they had no right to be therein, is ample 
evidence that the defendant knew of the propensity of 
children in the neighborhood to be attracted into the 
yard and to play therein, and yet he never locked the gate 
or took precautions to exclude them from the yard. He 
would even have us believe that little children would pro-
cure wire cutters and go through the fence in order to get 
into the yard. If this is true, the attraction of the prem-
ises must have been overpowering indeed: 
'' Q. How big were the holes~ 
A. Well, just big enough for them to get through. 
Q. How did they break through~ Did they break 
the wire in the fence~ 
A. Yes, break the wire and unwire it from the 
steel posts. 
Q. What did they do, cut it with clippers~ 
A. Well, sometimes, and sometimes they undo the 
fastenings and things.'' (Deposition, Thomas 
M. Child, p. 35, lines 2-9.) 
'' Q. Do you mean to tell me these little children 
cut through this quarter-inch fence periodi-
cally~ 
A. Well, some of it isn't quarter~inch. Some of 
it was patched out over to the other building 
12 
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by the neighbor's fence, and they had toggled 
that over there through it so that some of the 
fence was built a long while and toggled out 
over to the other buildings, which wouldn't 
be in my property at all, but it was fenced and 
was blocked off.'' (Deposition, Thomas B. 
Child, p. 35, lines 28-30 ; p. 36, lines 1-5.) 
The picture of little children armed with wire cut-
ters cutting their way into the defendant's yard in order 
to play among the various items of curiosity to be found 
there is, of course, unbelievable. However, it does demon-
strate that the defendant was fully aware of the power-
ful attractive features of the property and of the pro-
pensity of little children to come onto the property 
to play. 
The boy, Eddie Hoogland, had on many occasions 
played on the premises among the many interesting and 
curious objects to be found thereon, and on the date of 
the accident entered the premises through a gap in the 
fence and observed a drum containing a quantity of Seal-
Tex, an explosive compound. The plaintiff in attempting 
to see what was contained in the barrel which did not 
have a cap on it, lit a match, and the resultant explosion 
caused the loss of both legs and other permanent injuries. 
The affidavit in opposition to the defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, as well as the depositions, 
raised an issue of fact as to whether or not defendants 
should have been aware that the property was used as a 
playground by children in the area, and should have, 
therefore, taken precautions against storing on the prop-
13 
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erty materials that might injure children playing thereon. 
These are issues for a finding of fact and are not issues 
that can be determined on a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. Even the credibility of the defendants' statements 
in their affidavits and depositions is a question for the 
jury and their statements have been traversed. 
''Here we start with the general proposition 
that issues of negligence, including such related 
issues as contributory negligence, are ordinarily 
susceptible to summary adjudication either for or 
against the claimant, but should be resolved by 
trial in the ordinary manner .... 
''If in the above situation there have been, or 
in any situation there is, a. real issue as to the cred-
ibility or the moving party does not satisfy his 
burden of clearly establishing that there is no gen-
uine issue of material fact, then under basic princi-
ples, the motion for summary judgment should 
be denied.'' (Moore, Federal Practice, Sec. 
56.17 ( 42) . ) 
PoiNT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE DOCTRINE COM-
MONLY KNOWN AS THE ATTRACTIVE NUIS-
ANCE DOCTRINE. 
Ordinarily a person need not secure his property 
against excursion of persons not invited upon the prop-
erty even if these persons are children of immature judg-
ment. The exception to this rule is that if an owner main-
tains on the property any object or thing which a reason-
ably prudent person should foresee might attract chil-
dren upon the premises then, unless he takes reasonable 
14 
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precautions to secure the premises against the intrusion 
of children attracted by the objects upon the property, 
he is not entitled to set up as a defense the trespass of 
the child. 
According to Restatement of Torts, Section 339, the 
doctrine is applicable if: (1) the owner or person in pos-
session knows or should know that children are likely to 
trespass on place where the condition is maintained; and 
(2) the condition is one which the owner or possessor 
knows and realizes or should know and realize involves 
unreasonable risk of harm to children. 
Under the facts of this case it is hard to conceive of 
a situation which more strongly impels the application 
of the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. The defendant had 
created a park of the property, decorated with curious 
and unusual carvings and stone work, the interpretation 
and meaning of which was a puzzlement to most of those 
who came upon the property, and it was well known to 
him and his familythat the premises had drawn people 
from all over the area to observe and wonder at the 
curiosities which the defendant had created on the 
premises. Certainly, it is a question for the jury as to 
whether or not these things would excite the natural 
curiosity of children who appreciate no property lines 
when they are moved by the spirit of adventure to ex-
plore and examine such an intriguing property as the 
defendants made of this one. The defendant did not 
secure his premises, and indicates in his deposition that 
he constantly had to chastise children and advise them 
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that they could not play on the property. Even with this 
knowledge he did not even close the gate, and left on the 
property acids and other dangerous things that the most 
reckless person would appreciate created a danger to 
the children playing thereon. (Deposition, Thomas B. 
Child, p. 22, lines 18-20.) 
'' Q. You have chased a lot of kids out of your 
yard~ 
A. Yes, sir. Any time they are in there and I see 
them, out they go.'' 
'' Q. Why don't you lock your gate~ 
A. Because I use my yard for other things, and 
we come in from the back rather than opening 
the gates and coming in from 8th East and 
having the traffic next to my house. 
Q. Did you have a lot of traffic~ 
~A. Sure. That's how we haul our scaffold and 
things into the shed and come in and take the 
stuff, and that is the way we use them. 
Q. You don't make any effort to close your gates 
after you go in~ 
A. No." (Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 23, 
lines 6-16.) 
That the defendant had extended an implied invita-
tion to all persons who wished to come upon the premises 
and view the many curiosities, can scarcely be denied. 
(Deposition, Thomas B. Child, p. 24, lines 3-30.) 
''Q. And these stone monuments that you have cut 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. And they are there for exhibition purposes, 
aren't they 1 
A. Not particular. I have never asked anybody 
to come there to see my stuff. If they want 
to come, it is all right. If they do not, it is 
all right because it is always in a state of ex-
perimentation, and I am not trying to induce 
anybody to come into my yard. 
Q. You are kind of proud to have people come to 
look at those stone monuments you have 
carved out, aren't you~ 
A. In a general way. I am like anybody else. I like 
- when I do something that is noteworthy, I 
am willing to have it expressed. 
Q. You have never put limitation on the age of 
the people that can come and walk around 
the yard and look at those things, have you~ 
A. No. No, sir. 
Q. So you have seen people of all ages come to 
look at your work on these monuments, 
haven't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Over a period of time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, the newspapers have run quite a story 
on your yard and the spectacular monuments, 
carvings that have been made in there~ 
A. They have run a story a time or two.'' 
The defendant having admitted that he held the prop-
erty out to all who desired to come and enter and examine 
the premises certainly has taken upon himself an obliga-
tion to keep those premises safe, and the storing of acids 
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and chemicals thereon can scarcely meet the standard of 
care under these circumstances. In any event, this would 
be a matter for the jury to determine. If the Attractive 
Nuisance Doctrine does not apply in this case it is because 
there is no need for its application, the plaintiff being 
one of a group of the public who occupy the status of 
invitees to enter upon the property. 
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine is applicable in 
Utah, as cited in Brow·n v. Salt Lake City, supra, wherein 
the Court stated that if the attractive nuisance is artificial, 
uncommon, dangerous and attractive, and may, with rea-
sonable effort and expense, be guarded and made rea-
sonably safe, then the duty to make it so may not be 
disregarded. 
The defendants in arguing to the court below con-
tended that the object itself must be the thing that lures 
the child upon the premises in order for the Attractive 
Nuisance Doctrine to apply, and urged the court that a 
barrel with an opening in the top was not such an attrac-
tive nuisance. While it is conceded that the doctrine is not 
treated the same by all courts, the better reasoned deci-
sions do not make any such fine distinction, and hold that 
it is sufficient that the defendant could reasonably antici-
pate that children might be lured upon the property and 
then injured by some object thereon. In the case of Lone 
Sta.r Gas Co. v. Parsons, 14 Pac. 2d 369, the court pointed 
out that it is immaterial whether the object itself lured 
the infant upon the premises so long as the owner of the 
premises could reasonably anticipate that a child would 
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be attracted thereon, and onc·e upon· the premise.s would 
observe and be:· att11acted to: the object which aetually 
injured him. 
Also, in Little v. McCord, 151 S.W. 835, th.e, court 
pointed out that if children are attracte.d upon the prem-
ises because of some existing attraction, a condition. 
exists which the. owner cannot ignore in casting upon the. 
premises explosive substances which the children wo.uld 
be attracted to after entering the premises. 
To the same e:ffiect is. Vills v. Cloq.uet, 138 N.W. 33 
'vhere a child came in contact with explosives which he 
observed' after he was attracted on to the premises. De-
fendants urged to. the cou.rt. below that by reason of the 
plaintiff's age the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine could 
not be applied. However, as set forth in the affidavit in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
mental age of the plaintiff was less than eight years of 
age, and this fact is amply demonstrated by the deposition 
of the child. The cases hold that it is not a matter of 
chronological age, but a question of whether or not the 
child was of sufficient maturity for him to appreciate 
the implication of his actions, and this question is one for 
the jury. Keck v. Woodring, supra; Powers v. Harlow, 
19 N.W. 257. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants in this motion seek to have this 
Court rule as a matter of law that one who maintains a 
yard containing the most unusual curiosities and invites 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the public to come thereon to enjoy them and who knows 
that children frequently use the yard as a playground, 
cannot be liable as a matter of law for storing thereon 
dangerous substances that any reasonable person should 
know would be attractive to children. We respectfully 
submit that this is not the law, and that the issues in this 
case should be submitted to a jury and that to sustain 
the lower court's granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment would establish a principle that would be con-
trary to law and the public interest. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REGNAL· W. GARFF, JR., 
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON, and 
GORDON I. HYDE 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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